License to be more innovative

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A patent holder may choose to give up its current leading position through patent licensing in order to increase its incentive to innovate further and thus avoid falling behind its rivals in future RandD races. We show that because of this “catching-up” effect, licensing may occur even when it reduces current industry profits. The overall effect of licensing is to slow down the pace of innovation, as it reduces the licensee's incentive to conduct RandD.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)271-278
Number of pages8
JournalReview of Industrial Organization
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 1997
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Profitability
Innovation
Industry
Incentives
License
Licensing
RandD
Patent licensing
Profit
Catching-up
Patents

Keywords

  • Licensing
  • R and D race

Cite this

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title = "License to be more innovative",
abstract = "A patent holder may choose to give up its current leading position through patent licensing in order to increase its incentive to innovate further and thus avoid falling behind its rivals in future RandD races. We show that because of this “catching-up” effect, licensing may occur even when it reduces current industry profits. The overall effect of licensing is to slow down the pace of innovation, as it reduces the licensee's incentive to conduct RandD.",
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author = "Ping LIN",
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License to be more innovative. / LIN, Ping.

In: Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 12, No. 2, 01.04.1997, p. 271-278.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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