Abstract
Various debates on the desirability and rationality of life-extending enhancements have been pursued under the presupposition that a generic psychological theory of personal identity is correct. I here discuss how the narrative approach to personal identity can contribute to these debates. In particular, I argue that two versions of the narrative approach offer good reasons to reject an argument against the rationality of (certain forms of) life-extending enhancements.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 219-225 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Journal of Medical Ethics |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Apr 2018 |
Keywords
- enhancement
- persons
- quality/value Of life/personhood
- relational narrative approach
- self-constituting narrative approach
