Lobbying, multisector trade and sustainability of free trade agreement

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the sustainability of free‐trade agreements (FTA). FTA sustainability is influenced by governments’ valuations of political contributions, discount factors, the lobbying position of the specific‐interest groups in the intra‐industry trade sectors, and the sectoral coverage of the FTA. I find that (i) under certain conditions, the FTA under protectionist lobbying could be more sustainable than the FTA under no political pressure; (ii) the lobby‐supported FTA is more sustainable than the lobby‐opposed FTA and the FTA under no political pressure; and (iii) multisector trade enhances FTA sustainability. JEL Classification: F12, F13, F15.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1061-1083
Number of pages23
JournalCanadian Journal of Economics
Volume37
Issue number4
Early online date18 Oct 2004
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2004
Externally publishedYes

    Fingerprint

Bibliographical note

The paper benefited from presentations at the RIEB International Conference (Kobe), the 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society (Seattle), and the European Economic Association Meeting (Bolzano). Financial support from Hong Kong's Research Grant Council (DAG03/04.BM28) is gratefully acknowledged.

Keywords

  • lobbying
  • special-interest groups
  • political economy
  • free-trade agreements
  • multisector trade
  • defection incentives
  • sustainability
  • GATT Article XXIV

Cite this