Abstract
At the outset, it is important to be mindful of the following caveats: first, accurate information about CPLA capabilities and intentions are very difficult to obtain; second, there are significant differences of opinion as to whether and under what circumstances the United States would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in case of a CPLA attack; and third, there are uncertainties, such as the weather, which are unpredictable yet have an important influence on the CPLA’s decision to attack Taiwan and the probability of its success. Annual publications by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, for instance, can only provide a rough idea as to how many tanks, naval vessels, fighter planes etc. the PRC possesses. It is also very difficult for outsiders to tell which weapons can be operated with a reasonable degree of proficiency necessary for sustained military operations, as well as which systems are under repair or when the maintenance work will be completed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Taiwan’s Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era |
| Editors | Martin L. LASATER, Peter Kien-Hong YU |
| Publisher | Routledge |
| Pages | 121-141 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781000959512 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781032572260 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2000 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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