Majority voting with bribes does not eliminate voting cycles

Wing Chung PUN

    Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

    Abstract

    This paper shows that majority voting with bribes cannot generate voting cycles when voters' preferences are separable in alternatives and money. When preferences are not separable in alternatives and money, voting cycles are possible under majority voting with bribes.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)131-135
    Number of pages5
    JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
    Volume9
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1997

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    voting
    money

    Keywords

    • Arrow
    • Logrolling
    • Majority voting
    • Voting paradox

    Cite this

    PUN, Wing Chung. / Majority voting with bribes does not eliminate voting cycles. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 1997 ; Vol. 9, No. 1. pp. 131-135.
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    abstract = "This paper shows that majority voting with bribes cannot generate voting cycles when voters' preferences are separable in alternatives and money. When preferences are not separable in alternatives and money, voting cycles are possible under majority voting with bribes.",
    keywords = "Arrow, Logrolling, Majority voting, Voting paradox",
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    Majority voting with bribes does not eliminate voting cycles. / PUN, Wing Chung.

    In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 01.01.1997, p. 131-135.

    Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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