Abstract
This paper shows that majority voting with bribes cannot generate voting cycles when voters' preferences are separable in alternatives and money. When preferences are not separable in alternatives and money, voting cycles are possible under majority voting with bribes.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 131-135 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Journal of Theoretical Politics |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 1997 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
Keywords
- Arrow
- Logrolling
- Majority voting
- Voting paradox
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