Abstract
Cognitive neuroscientists are turning to an increasingly rich array of neurodynamical systems to explain mental phenomena. In these explanations, cognitive capacities are decomposed into a set of functions, each of which is described mathematically, and then these descriptions are mapped on to corresponding mathematical descriptions of the dynamics of neural systems. In this paper, I outline a novel explanatory schema based on these explanations. I then argue that these explanations present a novel type of dynamicism for the philosophy of mind and neuroscience, componential dynamicism, that focuses on the parts of cognitive systems that fill certain functional roles in producing cognitive phenomena.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 63 |
| Journal | Biology and Philosophy |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| Early online date | 25 Nov 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
This work has benefitted greatly from a number of comments over many years. The work draws on my dissertation at Duke University, and I would like to thank Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Alex Rosenberg, Karen Neander, Felipe De Brigard, and Michael Platt for their thoughtful input. I would also like to thank Gaultiero Piccinini, Chris Peacocke, William Lycan, Ann-Sophie Barwich, Jorge Morales, Nemira Gasiunas, Michael Weisberg, and the University of Pennsylvania philosophy of science reading group for critical comments.Keywords
- Cognition
- Cognitive neuroscience
- Dynamical systems
- Explanation