Merger control policy under China’s anti-monopoly law

Ping LIN, Jingjing ZHAO

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

China’s merger policy and enforcement approaches since its Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) took effect in August 2008 are by and large based on the same conceptual framework that is employed in advanced economies. While China has shown a very fast learning capability in conducting competition analysis, further capacity building in China is crucial. There is no clear evidence of industrial policy considerations being at the forefront in the eight published decisions by the Ministry of Commerce to date, except for its very early decisions. We propose a competition-neutral principle, which requires that a competition test be conducted before, and independently from, any consideration of industrial policy and argue that industrial policy matters only for competition-neutral mergers. On a more technical level, if China adopts the total welfare standard, then its treatment of efficiencies and the meaning of sufficiency of entry post merger should be modified accordingly from the US/EU consumer-oriented model.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)109-132
Number of pages24
JournalReview of Industrial Organization
Volume41
Issue number1-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2012

Fingerprint

Monopoly
China
Merger control
Industrial policy
Mergers
Enforcement
Capacity building
Commerce
Merger policy
Conceptual framework
Sufficiency

Keywords

  • China’s Anti-Monopoly Law
  • Industrial policy
  • Merger control
  • Theory of harm
  • Welfare standard

Cite this

LIN, Ping ; ZHAO, Jingjing. / Merger control policy under China’s anti-monopoly law. In: Review of Industrial Organization. 2012 ; Vol. 41, No. 1-2. pp. 109-132.
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Merger control policy under China’s anti-monopoly law. / LIN, Ping; ZHAO, Jingjing.

In: Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1-2, 08.2012, p. 109-132.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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