Metaphysical Nihilism and Modal Logic

Ethan BRAUER

doi:10.1007/s11098-022-01793-7

Metaphysical Nihilism and Modal Logic

Ethan BRAUER

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper I argue, that if it is metaphysically possible for it to have been the case that nothing existed, then it follows that the right modal logic cannot extend D, ruling out popular modal logics S4 and S5. I provisionally defend the claim that it is possible for nothing to have existed. I then consider the various ways of resisting the conclusion that the right modal logic is weaker than D.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2751-2763
Number of pages	13
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	179
Issue number	9
Early online date	11 Feb 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01793-7
Publication status	Published - Sept 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.

Keywords

Ersatzism
Possible worlds semantics
Subtraction argument

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10.1007/s11098-022-01793-7Licence: Other

https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-022-01793-7

Cite this

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Metaphysical Nihilism and Modal Logic

Abstract

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Keywords

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