Metaphysical Nihilism and Modal Logic


Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper I argue, that if it is metaphysically possible for it to have been the case that nothing existed, then it follows that the right modal logic cannot extend D, ruling out popular modal logics S4 and S5. I provisionally defend the claim that it is possible for nothing to have existed. I then consider the various ways of resisting the conclusion that the right modal logic is weaker than D.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2751-2763
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number9
Early online date11 Feb 2022
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.


  • Ersatzism
  • Possible worlds semantics
  • Subtraction argument


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