Mill's position on freedom of expression is attractive when understood as a position on freedom from legal restrictions on speech. However, Mill claims that it is more: it is a principle limiting justifiable social restrictions on speech, as well. Unfortunately, Mill's position on freedom of expression is counterintuitive once we include freedom from informal social sanctions. More importantly, the Harm Principle cannot be used as the norm for governing when moral censure of speech is and is not appropriate. Moral censure itself is a form of speech, and so requiring that we limit its use according to the Harm Principle will result in inconsistent verdicts about whether certain instances of expression are permissible.
|Publication status||Published - 12 Oct 2018|
|Event||International Workshop on Punishment and J.S. Mill : Themes from the Work of C.L. Ten - Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong|
Duration: 12 Oct 2018 → 13 Oct 2018
|Workshop||International Workshop on Punishment and J.S. Mill : Themes from the Work of C.L. Ten|
|Period||12/10/18 → 13/10/18|
|Other||Organised by Department of Philosophy, The Chinese University of Hong Kong|
Supporting organization: CUHK Centre for Bioethics
Bibliographical noteInvited paper.
BAKER, D. C. (2018). Mill, the Freedom from Sanction, and the Freedom to Sanction. Paper presented at International Workshop on Punishment and J.S. Mill : Themes from the Work of C.L. Ten, Hong Kong, Hong Kong.