Mixed-strategy nash equilibrium based upon expected utility and quadratic utility

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)


The notion of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium suffers from three inherent difficulties. First, given the equilibrium strategies of other players, there are many best replies. Second, the equilibrium is unstable. Third, comparative statics results are counterintuitive. We demonstrate that these difficulties all have their origin in von Neumann and Morgenstern′s expected utility. In contrast, players with “quadratic utility” have unique best replies and the Nash equilibrium appears to yield intuitive comparative statics results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)139-150
Number of pages12
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1995
Externally publishedYes


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