Abstract
This paper challenges a recent argument of Bird’s, which involves imagining that Réné Blondlot’s belief in N-rays was true, in favour of the view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge rather than truth. By considering several variants of Bird’s thought-experiment, it shows that the semantic account of progress cannot be so easily vanquished. A key possibility is that justification is only instrumental in, and not partly constitutive of, progress.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 277-278 |
Number of pages | 2 |
Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2008 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Alexander Bird
- Goal of inquiry
- Scientific progress
- Value problem