Objective Overall Resemblance

Dan MARSHALL

doi:10.1007/s44204-025-00327-2

Objective Overall Resemblance

Dan MARSHALL

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

Abstract

What is it for y to be objectively qualitatively overall at least as similar to x as z is? This paper defends a version of the following answer: it is for y to be at least as similar to x as z is in every qualitative respect. On the version defended in this paper, this analysis arguably entails that it is possible for some things to objectively qualitatively resemble each other more than they do other things. However, it also arguably entails that, given how the world contingently is, many things (if not all things) are incomparable in objective qualitative resemblance, where y and z are so incomparable to x iff: (i) it is not the case that y is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as z is, and (ii) it is not the case that z is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as y is.

Original language	English
Article number	100
Journal	Asian Journal of Philosophy
Volume	4
Early online date	19 Sept 2025
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-025-00327-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-025-00327-2
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 19 Sept 2025

Bibliographical note

Thanks to Ben Blumson, Sam Carter, three anonymous referees for Asian Journal of Philosophy, and the audiences at the Kinds and Quantities workshop at HKU 2015, the Indian and Analytic Approaches to Similarity workshop at NUS 2022, the AAP at ACU 2023, the Analytic Metaphysics Workshop at CUHK 2023, the Logic and Metaphysics Workshop at CUNY 2024, and the Thursday Philosophy Talk at Melbourne 2024.

Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s) 2025.

Funding

Research in this paper was supported by a General Research Fund grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong SAR, China (LU13603522). This funding body played no role in writing the manuscript other than the support it provided by providing me with a grant. No other support was provided for the research in this paper other than normal forms of support, such as my salary from Lingnan University. Open Access Publishing Support Fund provided by Lingnan University.

Keywords

Resemblance, Metaphysics, Disjunctive Properties

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Cite this

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title = "Objective Overall Resemblance",

abstract = "What is it for y to be objectively qualitatively overall at least as similar to x as z is? This paper defends a version of the following answer: it is for y to be at least as similar to x as z is in every qualitative respect. On the version defended in this paper, this analysis arguably entails that it is possible for some things to objectively qualitatively resemble each other more than they do other things. However, it also arguably entails that, given how the world contingently is, many things (if not all things) are incomparable in objective qualitative resemblance, where y and z are so incomparable to x iff: (i) it is not the case that y is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as z is, and (ii) it is not the case that z is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as y is.",

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N2 - What is it for y to be objectively qualitatively overall at least as similar to x as z is? This paper defends a version of the following answer: it is for y to be at least as similar to x as z is in every qualitative respect. On the version defended in this paper, this analysis arguably entails that it is possible for some things to objectively qualitatively resemble each other more than they do other things. However, it also arguably entails that, given how the world contingently is, many things (if not all things) are incomparable in objective qualitative resemblance, where y and z are so incomparable to x iff: (i) it is not the case that y is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as z is, and (ii) it is not the case that z is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as y is.

AB - What is it for y to be objectively qualitatively overall at least as similar to x as z is? This paper defends a version of the following answer: it is for y to be at least as similar to x as z is in every qualitative respect. On the version defended in this paper, this analysis arguably entails that it is possible for some things to objectively qualitatively resemble each other more than they do other things. However, it also arguably entails that, given how the world contingently is, many things (if not all things) are incomparable in objective qualitative resemblance, where y and z are so incomparable to x iff: (i) it is not the case that y is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as z is, and (ii) it is not the case that z is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as y is.

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SN - 2731-4642

VL - 4

JO - Asian Journal of Philosophy

JF - Asian Journal of Philosophy

M1 - 100

ER -

Objective Overall Resemblance

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

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Resemblance and Grounding

Cite this

Objective Overall Resemblance

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

Access to Document

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Resemblance and Grounding

Cite this