Abstract
I argue that Amie Thomasson’s recent theory of the methodology to be applied to find the truth-conditions for claims of existence faces serious objections. Her account is based on Devitt and Sterelny’s solution to the qua problem for theories of reference fixing; however, such a solution cannot be also applied to analyze existential claims.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 543-550 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Axiomathes |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 15 Sept 2011 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2013 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Ontology
- Existence
- Amie Thomasson
- Metaphysics