Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

53 Citations (Scopus)


When cost is private information in the Brander-Spencer model, the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options: a menu of policies and a uniform policy. The former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors. The latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information. The main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under Cournot competition while the opposite occurs under Bertrand competition.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)333-354
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of International Economics
Issue number3-4
Publication statusPublished - May 1994
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

I wish to thank Brian Copeland, Guofu Tan, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper. In particular, I am very grateful to Barbara Spencer and a referee for their extremely valuable advice and help which have led to great improvements in the quality of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.


  • Strategic trade policy
  • Assymmetric information
  • Reply

    QIU, L. D., Oct 2003, Journal of International Economics, 61, 1, p. 247-248 2 p.

    Research output: Other PublicationsOther ArticleCommunication

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