Organizational Form, Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover: Evidence from the Property-Liability Insurance Industry

Jiang CHENG, David J. CUMMINS, Tzuting LIN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the role of organizational form and ownership structure in corporate governance by examining CEO turnover for U.S. property–casualty insurers. Our article extends the prior literature by decomposing stock insurers into publicly traded and nonpublicly traded (closely held) entities and breaking down both types of stocks into family‐owned and nonfamily‐owned categories. We further subdivide family firms into those with family‐member CEOs and those with nonfamily CEOs. We find that the probability of nonroutine turnover has a significant negative relationship with firm performance. Turnover probabilities vary significantly by organizational form and ownership structure. Family firms with family‐member CEOs have the lowest turnover rate of any ownership type. The probability of nonroutine CEO turnover is lower for mutuals than for publicly traded nonfamily stock firms and also for all other types of stocks except closely held family stock firms and publicly traded family stocks with family‐member CEOs. The results provide further evidence that organizational form matters in terms of controlling agency costs in financial services firms.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)95-126
Number of pages32
JournalJournal of Risk and Insurance
Volume84
Issue number1
Early online date21 May 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2017
Externally publishedYes

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Property-liability insurance
Ownership structure
Executive turnover
Insurance industry
Organizational form
Chief executive officer
Turnover
CEO turnover
Insurer
Family firms
Ownership
Financial services
Firm performance
Corporate governance
Agency costs
Service firms

Bibliographical note

This paper won the Harold Skipper Best Paper Award at 2012 APRIA meeting and the Best Paper Award at 2012 NTUICF meeting.

Cite this

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abstract = "We investigate the role of organizational form and ownership structure in corporate governance by examining CEO turnover for U.S. property–casualty insurers. Our article extends the prior literature by decomposing stock insurers into publicly traded and nonpublicly traded (closely held) entities and breaking down both types of stocks into family‐owned and nonfamily‐owned categories. We further subdivide family firms into those with family‐member CEOs and those with nonfamily CEOs. We find that the probability of nonroutine turnover has a significant negative relationship with firm performance. Turnover probabilities vary significantly by organizational form and ownership structure. Family firms with family‐member CEOs have the lowest turnover rate of any ownership type. The probability of nonroutine CEO turnover is lower for mutuals than for publicly traded nonfamily stock firms and also for all other types of stocks except closely held family stock firms and publicly traded family stocks with family‐member CEOs. The results provide further evidence that organizational form matters in terms of controlling agency costs in financial services firms.",
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Organizational Form, Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover: Evidence from the Property-Liability Insurance Industry. / CHENG, Jiang; CUMMINS, David J.; LIN, Tzuting.

In: Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 84, No. 1, 03.2017, p. 95-126.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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