Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 291-302 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Corporate Governance: An International Review |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2005 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Ownership; corporate governance; executive compensation
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Ownership, corporate governance and top management pay in Hong Kong. / CHENG, Lai Sheung, Suwina; FIRTH, Michael.
In: Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 01.03.2005, p. 291-302.Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed)
TY - JOUR
T1 - Ownership, corporate governance and top management pay in Hong Kong
AU - CHENG, Lai Sheung, Suwina
AU - FIRTH, Michael
PY - 2005/3/1
Y1 - 2005/3/1
N2 - Top management pay has been the focus of intense scrutiny and debate in many countries. Important issues include how compensation is decided and whether it is a function of performance. The purpose of this study is to examine top management pay in Hong Kong and to investigate how it is affected by firms’ ownership and governance characteristics. A distinguishing characteristic of many listed firms in Hong Kong is the large proportion of share capital owned by the directors, and we argue that this moderates top management pay. We also investigate the role of institutional ownership and board composition in the determination of pay. We find that director and institutional ownership moderate compensation but that there is little evidence that they encourage pay-for-performance reward schemes.
AB - Top management pay has been the focus of intense scrutiny and debate in many countries. Important issues include how compensation is decided and whether it is a function of performance. The purpose of this study is to examine top management pay in Hong Kong and to investigate how it is affected by firms’ ownership and governance characteristics. A distinguishing characteristic of many listed firms in Hong Kong is the large proportion of share capital owned by the directors, and we argue that this moderates top management pay. We also investigate the role of institutional ownership and board composition in the determination of pay. We find that director and institutional ownership moderate compensation but that there is little evidence that they encourage pay-for-performance reward schemes.
KW - Ownership; corporate governance; executive compensation
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4060
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00423.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00423.x
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
VL - 13
SP - 291
EP - 302
JO - Corporate Governance (Oxford)
JF - Corporate Governance (Oxford)
SN - 0964-8410
IS - 2
ER -