PCAOB International Inspections and Merger and Acquisition outcomes

Yongtae KIM, Lixin Nancy SU, Gaoguang, Stephen ZHOU, Xindong (Kevin) ZHU

Research output: Other Conference ContributionsConference Paper (other)Other Conference Paperpeer-review


In this study, we examine how Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspections on non-U.S. auditors affect international Merger and Acquisition (M&A) outcomes. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that following the PCAOB inspections, clients of inspected auditors are more likely to become acquisition targets and if they become targets, the likelihood of deal completion increases. Acquirers also pay higher premiums to targets with PCAOB-inspected auditors, and the deal quality is higher for M&As involving targets with PCAOB-inspected auditors than those with non-inspected auditors. The effect of PCAOB inspections on M&A outcomes is more pronounced for targets with greater information risk and for those located in countries with weaker legal institutions. Collectively, our results suggest that PCAOB inspections improve the credibility of audited financial statements, reduce information risk in M&A deals, and enhance capital allocation in global markets. Our study provides novel evidence on the real economic benefits of the PCAOB international inspection program.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 30 May 2018
Event41st Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association - Bocconi University, Milano, Italy
Duration: 30 May 20181 Jun 2018


Conference41st Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association
Abbreviated titleEAA 2018
Internet address

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