Abstract
Prior research has shown that personnel constraints are far more prevalent in the public sector than in the private sector. Anecdotal accounts suggest that public managers are hamstrung by these personnel constraints – particularly their inability to reward and punish employees to promote higher performance. As a result, more than three decades of public management reform has attempted to loosen these constraints on the assumption that more personnel system flexibility will lead to increased organizational performance. We mount an empirical study to test this assumption with data taken from a large-scale survey of English local authorities and other sources. We operationalize personnel constraints using Rainey’s (1979; Rainey et al. 1976) longstanding measures: "difficulty in removing poor managers" and "difficulty in rewarding good managers". We show that attitudes towards personnel constraint vary within organizations in statistically significant ways. The results from our lagged autoregressive multiple regression models also show that one of our personnel constraint measures – "difficulty in removing poor managers" – is harmful to performance but that the other "difficulty in rewarding good managers" has weak but positive short-term effects. The implications of these findings for public management research and practice are considered in the concluding section of the paper.
Original language | English |
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Publication status | Published - Oct 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | The 10th Public Management Research Association Biennial Conference - Ohio State University, Columbus, United States Duration: 1 Oct 2009 → 3 Oct 2009 |
Conference
Conference | The 10th Public Management Research Association Biennial Conference |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Columbus |
Period | 1/10/09 → 3/10/09 |
Bibliographical note
The data were collected in a study commissioned by the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (England). We are also grateful to Hal G. Rainey for comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.Funding
The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Economic and Social Research Council. The research commenced under an Advanced Institute for Management Research Fellowship (Economic and Social Research Council /Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council grant 331-25-0006) and continues under a grant entitled “How Public Management Matters” (grant RES-062-23-0039).