Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 631-641 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Philosophy Compass |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 9 |
| Early online date | 4 Sep 2014 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sep 2014 |
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Philosophical expertise. / NADO, Jennifer.
In: Philosophy Compass, Vol. 9, No. 9, 09.2014, p. 631-641.Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed)
TY - JOUR
T1 - Philosophical expertise
AU - NADO, Jennifer
PY - 2014/9
Y1 - 2014/9
N2 - Recent work in experimental philosophy has indicated that intuitions may be subject to several forms of bias, thereby casting doubt on the viability of intuition as an evidential source in philosophy. A common reply to these findings is the ‘expertise defense’ – the claim that although biases may be found in the intuitions of non-philosophers, persons with expertise in philosophy will be resistant to these biases. Much debate over the expertise defense has centered over the question of the burden of proof; must defenders of expertise provide empirical evidence of its existence, or should we grant the existence of philosophical expertise as a ‘default’ assumption? Defenders have frequently appealed to analogy with other fields; since expertise clearly exists in, e.g., the sciences, we are entitled to assume its existence in philosophy. Recently, however, experimentalists have begun to provide empirical evidence that biases in intuition extend even to philosophers. Though these findings don't yet suffice to defeat the default assumption of expertise the analogy argument motivates, they do force any proponent of the analogy argument to provide more specific and empirically informed proposals for the possible nature of philosophical expertise.
AB - Recent work in experimental philosophy has indicated that intuitions may be subject to several forms of bias, thereby casting doubt on the viability of intuition as an evidential source in philosophy. A common reply to these findings is the ‘expertise defense’ – the claim that although biases may be found in the intuitions of non-philosophers, persons with expertise in philosophy will be resistant to these biases. Much debate over the expertise defense has centered over the question of the burden of proof; must defenders of expertise provide empirical evidence of its existence, or should we grant the existence of philosophical expertise as a ‘default’ assumption? Defenders have frequently appealed to analogy with other fields; since expertise clearly exists in, e.g., the sciences, we are entitled to assume its existence in philosophy. Recently, however, experimentalists have begun to provide empirical evidence that biases in intuition extend even to philosophers. Though these findings don't yet suffice to defeat the default assumption of expertise the analogy argument motivates, they do force any proponent of the analogy argument to provide more specific and empirically informed proposals for the possible nature of philosophical expertise.
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4146
U2 - 10.1111/phc3.12154
DO - 10.1111/phc3.12154
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
VL - 9
SP - 631
EP - 641
JO - Philosophy Compass
JF - Philosophy Compass
SN - 1747-9991
IS - 9
ER -