Plate's account of Intrinsicality


*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review


Jan Plate has recently proposed a highly sophisticated account of intrinsicality which, if successful, would analyse intrinsicality purely in terms of broadly logical notions. I argue that Plate's account is unsuccessful, since it falsely classifies as non-intrinsic the intuitively intrinsic property of being such that no part of one is non-self-identical.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)163-170
Number of pages8
JournalInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Issue number1
Early online date10 Mar 2021
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2024

Bibliographical note

Thanks goes to Jan Plate for helpful comments and discussion.

Research in this paper was supported by an Early Career Scheme grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong SAR, China [grant number LU23607616].


  • Intrinsicality
  • metaphysics
  • properties


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