Abstract
Jan Plate has recently proposed a highly sophisticated account of intrinsicality which, if successful, would analyse intrinsicality purely in terms of broadly logical notions. I argue that Plate's account is unsuccessful, since it falsely classifies as non-intrinsic the intuitively intrinsic property of being such that no part of one is non-self-identical.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 163-170 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 10 Mar 2021 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Thanks goes to Jan Plate for helpful comments and discussion.Funding
Research in this paper was supported by an Early Career Scheme grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong SAR, China [grant number LU23607616].
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SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being
Keywords
- Intrinsicality
- metaphysics
- properties
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Dive into the research topics of 'Plate's account of Intrinsicality'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 1 Finished
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A World without Properties: A Defence of Nominalism
MARSHALL, D. (PI)
Research Grants Council (Hong Kong, China)
1/01/17 → 31/12/19
Project: Grant Research
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