Political control and performance in China's listed firms

Eric C. CHANG, Man Lai WONG

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

90 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The performance implications of the involvement of grassroots local party committees of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the decision making of China's listed firms are investigated. First, we show that the decision-making power of local party committees relative to the power of the largest shareholders is associated positively with firm performance. This result suggests that party control restrains the largest shareholders from expropriation but that the existing level of party control is insufficient to control the largest shareholders. Second, we show that the decision-making power of local party committees relative to managers is associated negatively with firm performance. This result suggests that the political costs associated with party control over managers are more detrimental to firm performance than are agency problems and that the existing level of party control over managers is excessive. On balance, our results indicate that the existing level of party control is excessive and that reducing the decision-making power of local party committees would improve the performance of China's listed firms.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)617-636
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Comparative Economics
Volume32
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes

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China
Decision making
Firm performance
Large shareholders
Managers
Communist Party
Agency problems
Political costs
Expropriation

Cite this

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Political control and performance in China's listed firms. / CHANG, Eric C.; WONG, Man Lai.

In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2004, p. 617-636.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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AU - WONG, Man Lai

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