Presentism and the problem of cross-time relations

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    Abstract

    Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, ie, roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationPresentism : essential Readings
    PublisherLexington Books
    Pages207-225
    Number of pages19
    ISBN (Print)9780739145005
    Publication statusPublished - 28 Oct 2010

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    Presentism
    Entity
    Metaphysical

    Bibliographical note

    This article is also published as De Clercq, R. (2006). Presentism and the problem of cross-time relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(2), 386-402. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040930

    Cite this

    DE CLERCQ, R. (2010). Presentism and the problem of cross-time relations. In Presentism : essential Readings (pp. 207-225). Lexington Books.
    DE CLERCQ, Rafael. / Presentism and the problem of cross-time relations. Presentism : essential Readings. Lexington Books, 2010. pp. 207-225
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    DE CLERCQ, R 2010, Presentism and the problem of cross-time relations. in Presentism : essential Readings. Lexington Books, pp. 207-225.

    Presentism and the problem of cross-time relations. / DE CLERCQ, Rafael.

    Presentism : essential Readings. Lexington Books, 2010. p. 207-225.

    Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference ProceedingsBook ChapterResearchpeer-review

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    DE CLERCQ R. Presentism and the problem of cross-time relations. In Presentism : essential Readings. Lexington Books. 2010. p. 207-225