Pretending and Disbelieving

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


I formulate and criticise a condition that captures some recent ideas on the nature of pretence, namely, the disbelief condition. According to an initial understanding of this condition, an agent who is pretending that P must also disbelieve that P. I criticise this idea by proposing a counterexample showing that an agent may be in a state of pretence that does not imply disbelief in what is pretended. I also draw some general conclusions about the nature of pretence.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages14
JournalInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Early online date10 Oct 2021
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 10 Oct 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.


  • Pretence
  • acting
  • identity
  • imagination
  • meta-representation


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