Abstract
I formulate and criticise a condition that captures some recent ideas on the nature of pretence, namely, the disbelief condition. According to an initial understanding of this condition, an agent who is pretending that P must also disbelieve that P. I criticise this idea by proposing a counterexample showing that an agent may be in a state of pretence that does not imply disbelief in what is pretended. I also draw some general conclusions about the nature of pretence.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1991-2004 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| Early online date | 10 Oct 2021 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Keywords
- Pretence
- acting
- identity
- imagination
- meta-representation
