Primitive truth

Jamin ASAY

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Conceptual primitivism is the view that truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts. It cannot be defined, analyzed, or reduced into concepts that are more fundamental. Primitivism is opposed to both traditional attempts at defining truth (in terms of correspondence, coherence, or utility) and deflationary theories that argue that the notion of truth is exhausted by means of the truth schema. Though primitivism might be thought of as a view of last resort, I believe that the view is independently attractive, and can be argued for directly. In this paper I offer what I take to be the strongest argument in favor of conceptual primitivism, which relies upon the Fregean doctrine of the omnipresence of truth.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)503-519
Number of pages17
JournalDialectica
Volume67
Issue number4
Early online date14 Mar 2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2013

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Primitivism
Fundamental
Omnipresence
Doctrine
Gottlob Frege
Deflationary Theories

Cite this

ASAY, Jamin. / Primitive truth. In: Dialectica. 2013 ; Vol. 67, No. 4. pp. 503-519.
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ASAY, J 2013, 'Primitive truth', Dialectica, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 503-519. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12041

Primitive truth. / ASAY, Jamin.

In: Dialectica, Vol. 67, No. 4, 12.2013, p. 503-519.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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