TY - JOUR
T1 - Protest leadership in rural China
AU - LI, Lianjiang
AU - O'BRIEN, Kevin J.
N1 - For helpful comments, we would like to thank Yongshun Cai, Feng Chen, Xi Chen, David Meyer, Rachael Stern, Sidney Tarrow and Guobin Yang. Special note should be made of Professor Yu Jianrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who kindly shared some of his interview transcripts with us. Generous financial support was provided by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong and the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California-Berkeley.
Chinese version in Xiao Tangbiao (ed.), 《群体性事件研究》 (Research on Mass Incidents), Series on Research in Chinese Social Stability, Vol. 2 (Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe, 2011), pp. 126-141
PY - 2008/3
Y1 - 2008/3
N2 - Rural protest leaders in China play a number of roles. Among others, they lead the charge, shape collective claims, recruit activists and mobilize the public, devise and orchestrate acts of contention, and organize cross-community efforts. Protest leaders emerge in two main ways. Long-standing public figures initiate popular action on their own or in response to requests from other villagers; and ordinary villagers evolve into protest leaders when efforts to seek redress for a personal grievance fail. Rural officials sometimes attempt to co-opt or buy off protest leaders, but more often turn to repression. Although cracking down may inhibit further contention, at other times it firms up the determination of protest leaders and makes them more prone to adopt confrontational tactics, partly by enhancing their popular support, partly by increasing the costs of withdrawal.
AB - Rural protest leaders in China play a number of roles. Among others, they lead the charge, shape collective claims, recruit activists and mobilize the public, devise and orchestrate acts of contention, and organize cross-community efforts. Protest leaders emerge in two main ways. Long-standing public figures initiate popular action on their own or in response to requests from other villagers; and ordinary villagers evolve into protest leaders when efforts to seek redress for a personal grievance fail. Rural officials sometimes attempt to co-opt or buy off protest leaders, but more often turn to repression. Although cracking down may inhibit further contention, at other times it firms up the determination of protest leaders and makes them more prone to adopt confrontational tactics, partly by enhancing their popular support, partly by increasing the costs of withdrawal.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=40949161042&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0305741008000015
DO - 10.1017/S0305741008000015
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
AN - SCOPUS:40949161042
SN - 0305-7410
VL - 193
SP - 1
EP - 23
JO - China Quarterly
JF - China Quarterly
ER -