Quasirealism as semantic dispensability


Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


I argue that standard explanationist solutions to the problem of creeping minimalism are largely on the right track, but they fail to correctly specify the kind of explanation that is relevant to distinguishing realism from quasirealism. Quasirealism should not be distinguished from realism in terms of the explanations it gives of why a normative judgment—a normative sentence or attitude—has the semantic content that it has. Rather, it should be distinguished in terms of the explanations it offers of what the semantic content of a normative judgment is.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2313-2333
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number7
Early online date23 Sept 2020
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2021

Bibliographical note

Research in this paper was partially supported by research leave from Lingnan University, and was substantially supported by a General Research Fund grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong SAR, China (LU13601218). Thanks to Tristram McPherson, Dan Waxman, and the two anonymous referees, all of whom provided exceptional criticism, objections, and positive suggestions, without which this would be a much weaker paper.


  • Expressivism
  • Quasirealism
  • Creeping Minimalism
  • Deflationism


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