Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism

Giada FRATANTONIO*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

Abstract

In this paper, I consider the so-called Access Problem for Duncan Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). After reconstructing Pritchard's own response to the Access Problem, I argue that in order to assess whether Pritchard's response is a satisfying one, we first need an account of the notion of 'Reflective Access' that underpins Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism. I provide three interpretations of the notion of Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic interpretation. I argue that none of these three interpretations comes without problems. I conclude that, until we have a clear and unproblematic account of Reflective Access, the Access Problem remains a challenge for Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)555-575
Number of pages21
JournalEpisteme
Volume18
Issue number4
Early online date27 Aug 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 27 Dec 2021
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Access Problem
  • Epistemic Closure Principle
  • Epistemological Disjunctivism
  • Externalism/Internalism
  • McKinsey-paradox
  • Reflective Access

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