Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism

Giada FRATANTONIO*, Maria LASONEN-AARNIO

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsReview articleBook reviewpeer-review

Abstract

According to a version of Infallibilism, if one knows that p, then one’s evidence for p entails p. In her Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge (2018, OUP), Jessica Brown has recently developed two arguments against Infalliblism, which can both be presented in the form of a dilemma. According to the first dilemma, the infallibilist can avoid scepticism only if she endorses the claim that if one knows that p then p is part of one’s evidence for p. But this seems to come at the cost of making infelicitous claims. According to the second dilemma, the infallibilist cannot make sense of the phenomenon of defeat unless she rejects closure. In this paper, we argue that the infallibilist has the conceptual tools to resist both dilemmas.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2643–2654
Number of pages12
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume179
Issue number8
Early online date28 Jan 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2022
Externally publishedYes

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