Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 22-43 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Journal of Comparative Economics |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Feb 2012 |
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Keywords
- Corruption
- Regulation
- Telecommunications
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Regulation and corporate corruption : new evidence from the telecom sector. / BERG, Sanford V.; JIANG, Liangliang; LIN, Chen.
In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 40, No. 1, 01.02.2012, p. 22-43.Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed)
TY - JOUR
T1 - Regulation and corporate corruption : new evidence from the telecom sector
AU - BERG, Sanford V.
AU - JIANG, Liangliang
AU - LIN, Chen
PY - 2012/2/1
Y1 - 2012/2/1
N2 - This paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique cross-country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004), finding that (1) strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce corruption; (2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; (3) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; and (4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for connections.
AB - This paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique cross-country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004), finding that (1) strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce corruption; (2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; (3) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; and (4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for connections.
KW - Corruption
KW - Regulation
KW - Telecommunications
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/365
U2 - 10.1016/j.jce.2011.12.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jce.2011.12.001
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
VL - 40
SP - 22
EP - 43
JO - Journal of Comparative Economics
JF - Journal of Comparative Economics
SN - 0147-5967
IS - 1
ER -