Regulatory sanctions on independent directors and their consequences to the director labor market : evidence from China

Michael FIRTH, Sonia WONG, Qingquan XIN, Ho Yin YICK

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the regulatory sanctions imposed on independent directors for their firms’ financial frauds in China. These regulatory sanctions are prima - facie evidence of significant lapses in business ethics. During the period 2003–2010, 302-person-time independent directors were penalized by the regulator (the China Securities Regulatory Commission—the CSRC), and the two stock exchanges. We find that the independent directors with accounting experiences are more likely to be penalized by the CSRC, though they do not suffer more severe penalties than do the other sanctioned independent directors. We also find that independent directors suffer less severe penalties than do the insider directors. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the sanctions on independent directors are tied to their assumed ethical and legal responsibilities. Following a regulatory sanction, penalized independent directors experience a significant decline in the number of other board seats held. However, they can gain board seats in better quality firms. We find that interlocked firms that share penalized independent directors with the fraud firm do not suffer from a valuation decline. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory sanctions have not triggered further sanctions on the penalized directors in the labor market but they have, instead, created a disincentive for these directors to serve on the company boards of high-risk firms.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)693-708
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Business Ethics
Volume134
Issue number4
Early online date24 Sep 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2016

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sanction
director
labor market
China
evidence
firm
penalty
Independent directors
Sanctions
Labour market
Labour Market
business ethics
stock exchange
fraud
experience
responsibility
human being

Bibliographical note

Paper presented at the Conference on the Sustainable and Ethical Entrepreneurship, Corporate Finance and Governance, and Institutional Reform in China, Apr 06-07, 2013, Beijing, China.

Keywords

  • Business ethics
  • Financial fraud
  • Independent directors
  • Regulatory sanctions
  • Reputational damage in the labor market

Cite this

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title = "Regulatory sanctions on independent directors and their consequences to the director labor market : evidence from China",
abstract = "We investigate the regulatory sanctions imposed on independent directors for their firms’ financial frauds in China. These regulatory sanctions are prima - facie evidence of significant lapses in business ethics. During the period 2003–2010, 302-person-time independent directors were penalized by the regulator (the China Securities Regulatory Commission—the CSRC), and the two stock exchanges. We find that the independent directors with accounting experiences are more likely to be penalized by the CSRC, though they do not suffer more severe penalties than do the other sanctioned independent directors. We also find that independent directors suffer less severe penalties than do the insider directors. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the sanctions on independent directors are tied to their assumed ethical and legal responsibilities. Following a regulatory sanction, penalized independent directors experience a significant decline in the number of other board seats held. However, they can gain board seats in better quality firms. We find that interlocked firms that share penalized independent directors with the fraud firm do not suffer from a valuation decline. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory sanctions have not triggered further sanctions on the penalized directors in the labor market but they have, instead, created a disincentive for these directors to serve on the company boards of high-risk firms.",
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Regulatory sanctions on independent directors and their consequences to the director labor market : evidence from China. / FIRTH, Michael; WONG, Sonia; XIN, Qingquan; YICK, Ho Yin.

In: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 134, No. 4, 04.2016, p. 693-708.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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AB - We investigate the regulatory sanctions imposed on independent directors for their firms’ financial frauds in China. These regulatory sanctions are prima - facie evidence of significant lapses in business ethics. During the period 2003–2010, 302-person-time independent directors were penalized by the regulator (the China Securities Regulatory Commission—the CSRC), and the two stock exchanges. We find that the independent directors with accounting experiences are more likely to be penalized by the CSRC, though they do not suffer more severe penalties than do the other sanctioned independent directors. We also find that independent directors suffer less severe penalties than do the insider directors. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the sanctions on independent directors are tied to their assumed ethical and legal responsibilities. Following a regulatory sanction, penalized independent directors experience a significant decline in the number of other board seats held. However, they can gain board seats in better quality firms. We find that interlocked firms that share penalized independent directors with the fraud firm do not suffer from a valuation decline. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory sanctions have not triggered further sanctions on the penalized directors in the labor market but they have, instead, created a disincentive for these directors to serve on the company boards of high-risk firms.

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