Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues : Redux

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review


I construe Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) as an abstract combination of anti-skepticism and epistemic modesty, then re-evaluate the challenge posed to it by the missed clue counterexamples of Schaffer. The import of this challenge has been underestimated, as Schaffer’s specific argument invites distracting objections. I offer a novel formalization of RAT, accommodating a suitably wide class of concrete theories of knowledge. Then, I introduce ‘abstract missed clue cases’ and prove that every RA theory, as formalized, admits such a case. This yields an argument—in Schaffer’s spirit—that resists easy dismissal.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)245-276
JournalThe Journal of Philosophy
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - May 2024


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