Relief of disclosure in soft regulation: selective inaction as risk aversion in multiplicity

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference ProceedingsConference (Extended Abstracts)peer-review


This paper focuses on an organization's resistance behavior against conformity in two major contextual topics -- diffusion of global norms, and multiplicity of institutional complexity affecting cross-listing firms. We integrate institutional theory with research on the behavioral agency model to illustrate how firms' "selective inactions" effectuate resistance to the normative procedures. Where the firm is capable of but not willing to conform, we examine the substantive corporative governance quality as the basis of the firm’s likelihood to conform. However, cross-listing firms may be substantially structured which following recommended corporative governance codes; the attention based selective inaction might be a result of comparison between environment. We test our argument with a sample of internal control includes 1,340 firms listed in China from 2007 to 2010. In addition by examining corporate capital structures, we found that the a higher ratio of shares trading in the foreign market, associates with managers’ risk aversion behavior, further discouraging internal control reporting at firms’ home exchange.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2021 AOM Annual Meeting Proceedings
EditorsSonia TANEJA
PublisherAcademy of Management
ISBN (Print)2151-6561
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2021
Externally publishedYes


Dive into the research topics of 'Relief of disclosure in soft regulation: selective inaction as risk aversion in multiplicity'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this