Sales maximization or profit maximization? How state shareholders discipline their CEOs in China

Sonja OPPER, Man Lai, Sonia WONG, Yong YANG

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover in Chinese state-owned firms. Based on a sample of 1 555 turnover cases among listed firms in China during the period 1999-2003, we obtain three main results. First, CEO turnover is negatively related to the sales performance but not the profitability of the core business. Second, the negative relationship between CEO turnover and sales is stronger for firms with excessive employment and higher organizational slack. Third, there is a significant post-turnover increase in sales but a decline in profitability of the core business. Overall, our evidence suggests that state shareholders put a greater emphasis on sales generation than on profitability when they monitor their CEOs.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)347-375
Number of pages29
JournalAsia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies
Volume41
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2012

Fingerprint

Turnover
China
Shareholders
Chief executive officer
Profit maximization
Profitability
Organizational slack
Sales performance

Keywords

  • China's listed firms
  • Managerial monitoring
  • State ownership

Cite this

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title = "Sales maximization or profit maximization? How state shareholders discipline their CEOs in China",
abstract = "This study examines the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover in Chinese state-owned firms. Based on a sample of 1 555 turnover cases among listed firms in China during the period 1999-2003, we obtain three main results. First, CEO turnover is negatively related to the sales performance but not the profitability of the core business. Second, the negative relationship between CEO turnover and sales is stronger for firms with excessive employment and higher organizational slack. Third, there is a significant post-turnover increase in sales but a decline in profitability of the core business. Overall, our evidence suggests that state shareholders put a greater emphasis on sales generation than on profitability when they monitor their CEOs.",
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Sales maximization or profit maximization? How state shareholders discipline their CEOs in China. / OPPER, Sonja; WONG, Man Lai, Sonia; YANG, Yong.

In: Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3, 01.06.2012, p. 347-375.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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