Scientific progress without increasing verisimilitude : in response to Niiniluoto

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

First, I argue that scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude in science's theories. Second, I argue that increasing theoretical verisimilitude is not the central, or primary, dimension of scientific progress. Third, I defend my previous argument that unjustified changes in scientific belief may be progressive. Fourth, I illustrate how false beliefs can promote scientific progress in ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)100-104
Number of pages5
JournalStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Volume51
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2015

Bibliographical note

Special thanks to two anonymous referees, who provided many useful criticisms and comments on an earlier version of this paper; it is considerably stronger as a result of their efforts. Thanks also to attendees of the CHESS and Philosophy department seminars at the University of Durham, and Nancy Cartwright, Robin Hendry, Rune Nyrup and William Peden in particular.

Funding

This research was supported by: Hong Kong's University Grants Committee (“The Instrument of Science”, Humanities and Social Sciences Prestigious Fellowship); and also Durham University's Institute of Advanced Study in association with the European Union (COFUND Senior Research Fellowship).

Keywords

  • Instrumentalism
  • Niiniluoto
  • Scientific change
  • Scientific progress
  • Scientific realism
  • Verisimilitude

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