Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief

Chi Yin CHAN, Darrell P. ROWBOTTOM*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


A major problem posed by cases of self-deception concerns the inconsistent behavior of the self-deceived subject (SDS). How can this be accounted for, in terms of propositional attitudes and other mental states? In this paper, we argue that key problems with two recent putative solutions, due to Mele and Archer, are avoided by “the shifting view” that has been advanced elsewhere in order to explain cases where professed beliefs conflict with actions. We show that self-deceived agents may possess highly unstable degrees of belief concerning the matters about which they are self-deceived.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1204-1220
Number of pages17
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Issue number8
Early online date28 Oct 2019
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2019


  • Self-deception
  • degrees of belief
  • belief
  • revisionism
  • doxasticism


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