Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief

Chi Yin  CHAN; Darrell P. ROWBOTTOM

doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1646419

Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief

Chi Yin CHAN
, Darrell P. ROWBOTTOM^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A major problem posed by cases of self-deception concerns the inconsistent behavior of the self-deceived subject (SDS). How can this be accounted for, in terms of propositional attitudes and other mental states? In this paper, we argue that key problems with two recent putative solutions, due to Mele and Archer, are avoided by “the shifting view” that has been advanced elsewhere in order to explain cases where professed beliefs conflict with actions. We show that self-deceived agents may possess highly unstable degrees of belief concerning the matters about which they are self-deceived.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1204-1220
Number of pages	17
Journal	Philosophical Psychology
Volume	32
Issue number	8
Early online date	28 Oct 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1646419
Publication status	Published - Nov 2019

Keywords

Self-deception
degrees of belief
belief
revisionism
doxasticism

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10.1080/09515089.2019.1646419

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KW - degrees of belief

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KW - revisionism

KW - doxasticism

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Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief

Abstract

Keywords

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How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs

«In-between believing» and degrees of belief

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