We study two competing firms’ incentives to share demand information and their production timing strategies. One firm’s production time is fixed in her tradition of manufacturing previous product models. The other firm strategically chooses to produce before, simultaneously with, or after the routine firm. The two firms choose whether or not to disclose their private demand information, and then make quantity decisions based on available demand information either concurrently or sequentially. We find that both firms sharing information is the unique equilibrium outcome when the demand uncertainty is low, which is in stark contrast to the extant literature on horizontal information sharing with exogenous production timing.
|Publication status||Published - 6 Jan 2019|
|Event||The 10th POMS-HK International Conference 2019 : Operations Excellence for a Better World - City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong|
Duration: 5 Jan 2019 → 6 Jan 2019
http://www.cb.cityu.edu.hk/ms/pomshk2019/conferenceprogram.htm (Conference program)
|Conference||The 10th POMS-HK International Conference 2019 : Operations Excellence for a Better World|
|Period||5/01/19 → 6/01/19|
|Other||The Tenth POMS-HK International Conference was organized by City University of Hong Kong from January 5 to 6, 2019. Under the theme Operations Excellence for a Better World, this conference intended to provide a platform for exchanging research ideas, industry practice, and managerial insights.|