Sparse binary zero-sum games

David AUGER, Jialin LIU, Sylvie RUETTE, David L. SAINT-PIERRE, Olivier TEYTAUD

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Solving zero-sum matrix games is polynomial, because it boils down to linear programming. The approximate solving is sublinear by randomized algorithms on machines with random access memory. Algorithms working separately and independently on columns and rows have been proposed, with the same performance; these versions are compliant with matrix games with stochastic reward. (Flory and Teytaud, 2011) has proposed a new version, empirically performing better on sparse problems, i.e. cases in which the Nash equilibrium has small support. In this paper, we propose a variant, similar to their work, also dedicated to sparse problems, with provably better bounds than existing methods. We then experiment the method on a card game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)173-188
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Machine Learning Research
Volume39
Issue number2014
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event6th Asian Conference on Machine Learning, ACML 2014 - Nha Trang, Viet Nam
Duration: 26 Nov 201428 Nov 2014

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 D. Auger, J. Liu, S. Ruette, D.L. Saint-Pierre & O. Teytaud.

Keywords

  • Bandit algorithms
  • Sparsity
  • Zero-sum matrix games

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