TY - JOUR
T1 - Stable cartel with a cournot fringe in a symmetric oligopoly
AU - KONISHI, Hideo
AU - LIN, Ping
PY - 1999/10/1
Y1 - 1999/10/1
N2 - We consider a symmetric cartel formation game where the cartel, once formed, acts as a Stackelberg quantity leader and the nonmember firms play the Cournot game with respect to the residual demand. We show the existence of a stable cartel under fairly general demand and cost conditions. We also compare by means of numerical examples the size of stable cartels in our model with that in the price leadership model of d'Aspremont et al.
AB - We consider a symmetric cartel formation game where the cartel, once formed, acts as a Stackelberg quantity leader and the nonmember firms play the Cournot game with respect to the residual demand. We show the existence of a stable cartel under fairly general demand and cost conditions. We also compare by means of numerical examples the size of stable cartels in our model with that in the price leadership model of d'Aspremont et al.
KW - Cournot fringe
KW - Stable cartel
KW - Stackelberg quantity leader
UR - http://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/download.php/AA00260492-19990002-0001.pdf?file_id=28467
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/7177
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
SN - 0022-9709
VL - 36
SP - 1
EP - 10
JO - Keio Economic studies
JF - Keio Economic studies
IS - 2
ER -