Abstract
When a downstream producer enters backward into the input market, a "helping the rivals effect" exists: Such entry hurts the firm's downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus benefits its rival downstream firms. This negative externality prevents the newly-created upstream unit from expanding. A spin-off enables the firm to credibly expand in the input market, thereby forcing its upstream competitors to behave less aggressively. Spin-offs occur in equilibrium if and only if the number of downstream firms exceeds a threshold level. When there is more than one integrated firm, a spin-off by a firm can trigger spin-offs by others that would not occur otherwise.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 977-993 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | European Economic Review |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2006 |
Keywords
- Commitment effect
- Multilateral negotiations
- Spin-offs
- Successive Cournot oligopoly