Abstract
This paper provides a model of bequest and investment in children's human capital at low incomes. It posits that parents and children are linked through their common concern of grandchildren and intergenerational transfers provide a material basis for the perpetuation of the family line. The model characterizes intergenerational strategic interactions in a dynamic game theoretical framework. Moreover, it explores intergenerational uncertainty as a source of precautionary saving. In contrast with the existing literature, the model implies that there are qualitative differences between precautionary saving from one's own income uncertainty and precautionary bequests from children's income uncertainty.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 451-479 |
Number of pages | 29 |
Journal | Journal of Development Economics |
Volume | 76 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Apr 2005 |
Bibliographical note
I thank Oded Galor, Herschel I. Grossman, David N. Weil, Ping Lin, and particularly two anonymous referees, whose insightful comments and suggestions improved the quality of the paper significantly.Funding
The financial support from a Sloan Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are entirely my own.
Keywords
- Intergenerational transfers
- Precautionary bequest
- Survival of the gene