Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

Jung HUR, Larry D. QIU

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

Abstract

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)33-59
Number of pages27
JournalWorld Economy
Volume43
Issue number1
Early online date27 Nov 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2020

Fingerprint

free trade
market
concession
welfare
incentive
Tariffs
Free trade agreements
evidence

Bibliographical note

This project was financially supported by the Research Grant Council Competitive Earmarked Research Grant 2012–2014 (No. HKU751812B) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. We also benefited from a seminar at the University of International Business and Economics (China) and conference presentations in Asia‐Pacific Trade Seminars 2016 and IEFS China 2016.

Keywords

  • free trade agreement
  • FTA formation
  • FTA incentive
  • FTA network
  • global welfare
  • tariff

Cite this

@article{812ab5d57b6c4b739ebc9e5a46cdee1e,
title = "Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks",
abstract = "This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.",
keywords = "free trade agreement, FTA formation, FTA incentive, FTA network, global welfare, tariff",
author = "Jung HUR and QIU, {Larry D.}",
note = "This project was financially supported by the Research Grant Council Competitive Earmarked Research Grant 2012–2014 (No. HKU751812B) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. We also benefited from a seminar at the University of International Business and Economics (China) and conference presentations in Asia‐Pacific Trade Seminars 2016 and IEFS China 2016.",
year = "2020",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1111/twec.12868",
language = "English",
volume = "43",
pages = "33--59",
journal = "World Economy",
issn = "0378-5920",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",
number = "1",

}

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks. / HUR, Jung; QIU, Larry D.

In: World Economy, Vol. 43, No. 1, 01.2020, p. 33-59.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

TY - JOUR

T1 - Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

AU - HUR, Jung

AU - QIU, Larry D.

N1 - This project was financially supported by the Research Grant Council Competitive Earmarked Research Grant 2012–2014 (No. HKU751812B) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. We also benefited from a seminar at the University of International Business and Economics (China) and conference presentations in Asia‐Pacific Trade Seminars 2016 and IEFS China 2016.

PY - 2020/1

Y1 - 2020/1

N2 - This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.

AB - This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.

KW - free trade agreement

KW - FTA formation

KW - FTA incentive

KW - FTA network

KW - global welfare

KW - tariff

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85075719322&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/twec.12868

DO - 10.1111/twec.12868

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

AN - SCOPUS:85075719322

VL - 43

SP - 33

EP - 59

JO - World Economy

JF - World Economy

SN - 0378-5920

IS - 1

ER -