Tarski and primitivism about truth

Jamin ASAY

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

1 Scopus Citations

Abstract

Tarski's pioneering work on truth has been thought by some to motivate a robust, correspondence-style theory of truth, and by others to motivate a deflationary attitude toward truth. I argue that Tarski's work suggests neither; if it motivates any contemporary theory of truth, it motivates conceptual primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental, indefinable concept. After outlining conceptual primitivism and Tarski's theory of truth, I show how the two approaches to truth share much in common. While Tarski does not explicitly accept primitivism, the view is open to him, and fits better with his formal work on truth than do correspondence or deflationary theories. Primitivists, in turn, may rely on Tarski's insights in motivating their own perspective on truth. I conclude by showing how viewing Tarski through the primitivist lens provides a fresh response to some familiar charges from Putnam and Etchemendy.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-18
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophers Imprint
Volume13
Issue number17
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2013

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Primitivism
Theory of Truth
Primitivist
Fundamental
Correspondence Theory
Deflationary Theories

Cite this

ASAY, Jamin. / Tarski and primitivism about truth. In: Philosophers Imprint. 2013 ; Vol. 13, No. 17. pp. 1-18.
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ASAY, J 2013, 'Tarski and primitivism about truth', Philosophers Imprint, vol. 13, no. 17, pp. 1-18.

Tarski and primitivism about truth. / ASAY, Jamin.

In: Philosophers Imprint, Vol. 13, No. 17, 08.2013, p. 1-18.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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