The abductive case for humeanism over quasi-perceptual theories of desire

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

Abstract

A number of philosophers have offered quasi-perceptual theories of desire, according to which to desire something is roughly to “see” it as having value or providing reasons. These are offered as alternatives to the more traditional Humean Theory of Motivation, which denies that desires have a representational aspect. This paper examines the various considerations offered by advocates to motivate quasi-perceptualism. It argues that Humeanism is in fact able to explain the same data that the quasi-perceptualist can explain, and in one case the Humean explanation is superior. Quasi-perceptual accounts of desire, the paper concludes, are for the most part unmotivated.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-29
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Volume8
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2014

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Humeanism
Humean Theory of Motivation
Philosopher
David Hume

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abstract = "A number of philosophers have offered quasi-perceptual theories of desire, according to which to desire something is roughly to “see” it as having value or providing reasons. These are offered as alternatives to the more traditional Humean Theory of Motivation, which denies that desires have a representational aspect. This paper examines the various considerations offered by advocates to motivate quasi-perceptualism. It argues that Humeanism is in fact able to explain the same data that the quasi-perceptualist can explain, and in one case the Humean explanation is superior. Quasi-perceptual accounts of desire, the paper concludes, are for the most part unmotivated.",
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The abductive case for humeanism over quasi-perceptual theories of desire. / BAKER, Derek.

In: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 10.2014, p. 1-29.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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