The early reception of Bernard Williams’ reduplication argument (1956–62)

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

Abstract

The reduplication argument advanced by Bernard Williams in 1956 has greatly stimulated the contemporary debate on personal identity. The argument relies on a famous thought experiment that, although not new in the history of philosophy, has engaged some of the most influential contemporary philosophers on the topic. I propose here an interpretation of the argument and a reconstruction of the early reception that Williams’ paper had in the 6 years immediately after its publication. The works discussed include papers by C. B. Martin, G. C. Nerlich, R. Coburn, and J. M. Shorter.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)326-345
Number of pages20
JournalArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Volume99
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2017

    Fingerprint

Cite this