The effects of political connections and state ownership on corporate litigation in China

Michael Arthur FIRTH, Oliver M. RUI, Wenfeng WU

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

95 Citations (Scopus)


We examine the effects of corporate lawsuits in China and find that litigation announcements depress the stock prices of both defendant and plaintiff firms. Financially distressed defendants suffer lower stock returns. We find that politically connected defendants are favored in the judicial process: they have higher stock returns and are more likely to appeal against adverse outcomes and to obtain a favorable appeal result. State-controlled defendants fare better than privately controlled defendants when it comes to appeals but do not have higher stock returns. The evidence suggests that there is bias in the judicial process.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)573-607
Number of pages35
JournalThe journal of Law and Economics
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2011


  • corporate litigation
  • court bias
  • political connections
  • state ownership
  • wealth effects

Cite this