The future-like-ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)199-204
Number of pages6
Issue number3
Early online date25 Jan 2018
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2018


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